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As studied elsewhere, other than providing in-service education for its members and 
functioning as a medium of professional control by establishing general standards of 
conduct, professional associations also work to uphold and protect the interests of their 
members. Professional bodies are thus both the product of and the driving force for 
professionalisation and the consolidation of professional interest. Bred within the 
historical context of the cultural and social collision between local, traditional authority 
and western colonial power in the last two centuries, the development of the (western-
based) medical profession in Malaya (known as Malaysia from 1963 onwards and thus 
shall be used for entire article) shares many similarities with its western counterparts in 
terms of professionalisation. The establishment of the Straits Medical Association (SMA) 
in 1890 by a group of medical officers, all foreign, was one effort to advance the 
development of the profession and cater to the need for in-service education in the 
medical community. The association, renamed as the Malayan Medical Association 
(MMA) in 1959, was the sole official representative for the medical profession in 
Malaysia from the post-war years until the 1980s, when the launching of privatisation 
under the Mahathir administration led to differentiation within the healthcare industry. 
The emergence of managerialism and the growth of bureaucratisation within the modern 
hospital setting in the past three decades have added further to the tension between 
different medical groups in the healthcare industry. By investigating the development of 
different medical and paramedical groups, this paper aims to capture the main 
contention between these groups and explain the meaning of interest pluralisation in the 
Malaysian healthcare industry. This paper argues that differentiation and interest 
pluralisation are inevitable outcomes of industrial development and require 
democratisation as a resolution to the conflict between different interest groups. 
 
Keywords: healthcare privatisation, differentiation, professional group, interest group, 
conflict 
 
 
INTRODUCTION  
 
Like their counterparts in western countries, biomedicine-oriented healthcare 
professions as a preferred career is a new phenomenon in Malaysia. Just a 
century ago, western biomedical services, as introduced by the British Malaya 
Por Heong Hong 
240 
government, were but one option among many competing traditional practitioners 
(Manderson, 1996). Today, its acceptance by the wider society is evident. 
Increasing numbers of biomedicine-based clinics and hospitals have been 
established, and medical courses are becoming one of the preferred choices of 
young Malaysians since the privatisation of both the healthcare industry and 
higher education were launched two decades ago under Mahathir's administration. 
This can be seen in the rapid rise of the total number of private hospitals—from 
50 in 1980 to 233 in 20062—and medical schools—from only 1 in 1962 to 10 in 
2000 and 25 in 20103. The physician-to-population ratio, which is projected to be 
1:600 by 20204, is even taken by the Malaysian government as an indicator of 
development, in accordance with achieving Vision 2020 or becoming fully 
developed. Although the editor of Berita MMA, Dr Kuljit Singh, addressed the 
deep concern over the surplus of doctors and the congestion in the supply chain 
of new doctors in the February 2010 issue, he denied that it is a reflection of 
preference by Malaysian parents and the younger generation for the medical 
profession as a remunerative career (2010: 2).  
 
Forming a new social stratum in post-independent Malaysian society, physicians 
and other healthcare professionals are often termed a new middle class, a social 
construct used by social scientists to indicate a change in social stratification. 
Based on common characteristics and interests, each of the newly emergent 
occupations or professions within the healthcare industry tends to organise itself 
along a different professional line, and it sometimes becomes political when it 
comes to securing each of its occupation/profession-based, sectoral interests in 
the face of intense competition in the contemporary healthcare market. The 
activities of occupational or professional groups and the diversification of interest 
within the healthcare industry, however, rarely become the objects of attention of 
social scientists. This new stratum, rather, is often taken as a monolithic 
occupational subcategory under the umbrella of the new middle class, which is 
supposed to put aside self-interest and is expected to selflessly provide healthcare 
services in order to maintain or uplift the health status of the larger population on 
the nation's journey to Vision 2020. Such simplistic construction of the 
professions reflects a functional view of the emergence of new occupations, 
regarding them as merely an instrument of national development in the post-
independence era, and ignores the dynamics of differentiation within the 
healthcare sector and the impact that pluralisation has on healthcare policy.  
 
Although competition and conflict between different groups within the Malaysian 
healthcare industry have become intense and frequent in the last two decades, as 
observable in several episodes of inter-group contentions and widely covered by 
the media, these events seldom reach the attention of social scientists. Only a 
handful of researchers and observers (Barraclough, 2000; Barraclough and Phua, 
2007; Por, 2006) are concerned with differentiation within the healthcare sector 
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and the role of certain professional groups in the healthcare policy-making 
process. By investigating the pluralisation and differentiation that come with 
structural changes in the economy and development since the implementation of 
privatisation by the Malaysian government in the late 1980s, Barraclough (2000) 
and Barraclough and Chee (2009) highlight the importance of the role of the 
broad-based mobilisation of civil groups, like the Citizen's Health Initiative 
(CHI), Malaysia Trade Union Congress (MTUC), Federation of Malaysian 
Consumers Associations (FOMCA) and Malaysia Medical Association (MMA), 
in pushing policy change. Their focus, nevertheless, is on the coalescence of the 
professional group with other civil groups as an organised bloc vis-à-vis the state, 
leaving the divergent concerns of different professional groups and conflicting 
interests of healthcare providers and communities unexplored. Barraclough and 
Phua (2007: 25) are also aware that different groups have different interests and 
are unequally represented or consulted in the federal policy-making process, but 
their focus is on the state as the prime player that takes the initiative to invite 
different groups for consultation. Por (2006) is concerned with interest 
diversification and competing groups within healthcare industry; her probe, 
however, was not a systematic inspection of group-based divergence and inter-
group conflicts within the healthcare industry. In a nutshell, group politics within 
the Malaysian healthcare sector is an area that has not been investigated 
systematically, leaving the structural divergence of groups and their conflicts a 
missing piece of the jigsaw puzzle that is a more comprehensive picture of the 
healthcare industry. 
 
Given the rapid diversification of interests since the launch of privatisation as a 
strategy and engine to achieve Vision 2020, the significance of fragmentation 
within the Malaysian healthcare industry and inter-group relations on healthcare-
policy decision-making is certainly worth further and deeper exploration. The 
main objective of this article is thus threefold: firstly, to investigate and theorise 
the differentiation, as manifested in the development of a variety of occupational-
turned-political groups and their advocacy activities within the healthcare 
industry; secondly, to identify different loci of power in order to capture the 
dynamics and interaction among various sectors within the industry, an arena in 
which competition for limited resources takes place; and finally, to inspect the 
impact of group politics on the healthcare system. This article argues that 
differentiation and interest pluralisation are inevitable outcomes of industrial 
development and require further democratisation as a resolution to mediate the 
conflict between different interests. 
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THEORISING POLITICS OF SOCIAL DIFFERENTIATION AND 
PROFESSIONAL GROUPS  
 
Broadly speaking, there are two ways to investigate and theorise occupational or 
professional group activities: focus on the nature of the subsystem or group and 
factors that affect it, "among these factors the larger system in which it operates;" 
or focus "on the larger system, raising questions about the significance within it 
of any pattern of pressure group activity which it comprehends" (Eckstein, 1960: 
151). Because there are only a few studies on Malaysian group politics within the 
healthcare industry, much of the analysis in this article borrows concepts and 
experiences from studies elsewhere. In this section, we will move from the micro 
view of subsystems to the broad view of group politics by focusing on two major 
themes: "industrial development and differentiation" and "group politics and 
political economic environment." 
 
Industrial Development and Differentiation 
 
As suggested by Dahrendorf (1959), technical innovations in production and new 
philosophies of industrial organisation have given rise to new divisions of labour 
and thus to further differentiation within industrial society. Increasingly complex 
machines and technology require more skilled workers, and the more skilful one 
is the higher one's prestige and authority is in the hierarchy of labour. Parallel 
with technology development is the separation of ownership and administration. 
"The roles of owner and manager, originally combined in the position of the 
capitalist, have been separated and distributed over two positions, those of 
stockholder and executive" (Dahrendorf, 1959: 49) in industrial society. With 
these developments, authority and power is distributed unequally along different 
levels of skill, with the more skilful possesses more authority and thus more 
powerful; the manager exercises authority, as delegated by the owner, to 
command and expect obedience from his/her subordinate. 
 
Generally, these two lines of development are true not only in the general 
industrial society but also, particularly, in the healthcare industry (Krause, 1971: 
124–134). Firstly, the emergence of paramedical services is a response to 
advancements in healthcare technology. Although their work, just like the work 
of physicians, is also organised around the work of healing, they are ultimately 
controlled by the latter, because physicians were able to secure "the exclusive 
right to practice in face of the fact that many kinds of healers were [also] 
practicing", with the support of the state, through the licensure system (Freidson, 
1973: 47–48). It is in this sense that professional dominance by physicians within 
the healthcare industry is political in its character and distinctive in modern, 
industrial society. The distinction between paramedical occupations and the more 
established profession of medicine could thus be understood as "the relative          
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lack of autonomy, responsibility, authority and prestige" and it is distinguished 
"sociologically than technologically" (Freidson, 1973: 49). Although pre-
industrial societies also saw a certain degree of division of labour among 
herbalists, midwives, shamans and other traditional healers, "the distinctive 
division of labour labelled paramedical" is, however, "relatively new and is 
complex only in the highly industrialised societies" (Freidson, 1973: 50). 
Relations between physicians and paramedics are thus one of the potential 
sources of conflict within modern healthcare industry.  
 
With the advancement of management science, two management techniques—the 
separation of ownership and management (Mills, 1967: 113–121) and third          
party administration (Krause, 1971: 133)—have been introduced into the 
administration of the healthcare sector. These two new management philosophies 
have generated more potential sources of conflict within the modern healthcare 
sector. Firstly, with the separation of ownership and administration, an 
intermediate level of rank, which includes the manager and the administrator, 
who work between the owner and the healthcare provider, has been created 
within the modern hospital setting. It is very common to observe disgruntlement 
among corporate bond physicians towards the manager and administration officer, 
who tends to act in the interest of the owner.  
 
Secondly, Managed Care Organisations (MCO) or third party administrators 
(TPA) arose out of concern over the rising cost of healthcare services in the 
second half of the last century (Krause, 1971: 133). Working in addition to the 
once simple patient-doctor relationship, MCOs and TPAs are granted the 
authority to control costs by representing their clients or patients by collectively 
bargaining with healthcare providers. An example of an MCO or TPA is a health 
insurance company. Although MCOs and TPAs do not own hospitals, health 
insurance companies are influential because they might propose rules that affect 
the terms of payment for healthcare services, which could have a great impact on 
the interests of both physicians and paramedics. Figure 1 illustrates the multiple 
layers of relationships between owners, managers, healthcare providers and TPAs 
within healthcare organisations. The vertical dotted rectangle illustrates the 
separation of ownership and management and division of labour among 
healthcare providers, while the horizontal dotted rectangle shows the triangular 
relationship between healthcare provider, MCO/TPA and patients. 
 
Although the pathway of industrial development differs from one society to 
another, newly formed differentiation and pluralisation are inevitable outcomes 
of development. The degree and aspect of differentiation, and whether divergent 
interests will organise themselves and engage in advocacy activities and 
collective bargaining, is subject to empirical study. The latter depends on a series 
of factors, ranging from internal conditions within the community, such as the 
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availability of leadership and resources, to the external economic and political 
environment, which could be either conducive to group politics or constraining of 
them. This article will focus only on the inter-group and the state-group 
relationships. The following subsection focuses on the discussion of the larger 
political-economic environment and its relation with interest groups. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1:  Relationship among different groups within healthcare sector 
 
Group Politics and the Political-Economic Environment 
 
The larger system that occupational associations or interest groups originate from 
and operate within consists of multiple sets of institution and multiple layers of 
authority. Based on the trichotomy of civil society theory and the particularity of 
the healthcare industry, Figure 2 illustrates the triangular relationship between the 
state, market and civil society and the direction and possible content of 
interaction between different spheres, institutions and groups. In theory, civil 
society refers to an arena of uncoerced action where different interests are 
articulated through voluntary self-organisation or institutions, interposed between 
the family and the state, that form the basis of a functioning society as opposed to 
the coercive structures of a state, regardless of that state's political system 
(Robertson, 2002: 75; Scott and Marshall, 2005: 72). The state is a set of 
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institutions, which sets the rules and parameters for the mediation of social or 
political conflicts among various interests over the use of resources and the 
direction of public policy, including such institutions as the armed forces, civil 
service or state bureaucracy, judiciary, and local and national councils of           
elected representatives, such as a parliament (Scott and Marshall, 2005: 631–633). 
Conceptually, the institutions of civil society, the state and markets are 
distinctively different from each other, but in practice, there is no clear boundary 
between the three institutions as none could exist without the other two 
(Robertson, 2002: 75).  
 
It should be noted that the tripartite division is taken as an analytical tool, not a 
normative framework, to make sense of the activities of different players, both 
state and non-state. Certain researchers, such as Barraclough and Chee (2009), 
are concerned with the role of professional associations as civil organisations that 
oppose the state. This study views civil society as an arena occupied by voluntary 
groups with different degrees of politicisation and unequal resources over which 
they tend to compete. Different forms of voluntary social organisations, such as 
charity groups, religious groups, occupational/professional associations, non-
governmental groups, guilds and advocacy groups, may seek to influence the 
government's legislation or encourage or prevent changes in existing policy, but 
they are not equally powerful or resourceful. As aggregated interests, pressure 
groups can exercise influence over governments and policy through many 
channels. They can educate citizens about the issues they are concerned with 
through their publications, publicity campaigns and advocacy efforts (Eckstein, 
1960; Berry, 1989). By shaping public opinion, they are able to set their agenda, 
turn problems into issues and bring issues to light. They may also closely monitor 
programs or follow policy recommendations that affect their constituents and "try 
to draw attention to shortcomings through such strategies as issuing evaluative 
reports and contacting people in the media" (Berry, 1989: 7). When they attempt 
to influence policymakers, they are engaging in lobbying. The nature of the state 
may in turn affect the activities of the groups; sometimes, consultations are 
sought and different interests are equally or unequally represented in the policy-
making process, depending on the political-economic environment.  
 
Under a cabinet system, interest groups tend to channel their influence through 
the executive branch, while in an assembly-dominated context, collective 
bargaining tends to surround the legislature (Ball and Millard, 1986: 42–44). In 
political systems that practice corporatism, interest groups' opinions are usually 
institutionalised through consultations (Eckstein, 1960: 25). There are also 
differences between federal and centralised systems. The point of exerting 
influence, however, depends on issues, as not all issues fall within the discretion 
of the provincial government in a federal system. In a centralised environment, 
interest groups tend to influence central departments (Ball and Millard, 1986: 43). 
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Another important factor that influences group politics is fragmentation between 
governmental institutions. Differences not only take place between larger 
institutions, such as the legislative and executive branches, but power is also 
dispersed across different departments within the same institution. Fragmented 
decision-making authority thus affects the strategies of interest groups. Taking 
Malaysia as an example, tension between the Prime Minister Department's 
Economic Planning Unit (EPU) and the Ministry of Health (MOH) over 
healthcare-policy decisions is one of the fragmentations within the Malaysian 
Government. This tension was exposed in late 2005 when the EPU disclosed 
terms of reference on the National Health Financing Scheme (NHFS), which the 
MOH was unable to provide when pressed by a civil coalition called the 
Coalition Against Healthcare Privatisation (CAHP). The event uncovered the 
MOH's relatively minor role—with respect to the EPU—in healthcare financing 
policy.  
 
Pressure groups also structure their influence differently according to the nature 
of the party system. One-party-systems and two-party-systems, compared with 
multi-party systems, offer fewer targets for pressure groups to channel influence. 
The degree of strictness of intra-party discipline also affects the ease of 
infiltration by external groups. Ideology is another factor that might limit the  
attractiveness of a party only to certain groups. For example, business groups 
mainly support parties on the right in both Britain and the US (Ball and Millard, 
1986: 44–46). Major differences in party ideology in Malaysia are, however, are 
not based on economics, but on the difference between communal based and non-
communal based. Although some political economists (Subramaniam, 2000; 
Chan, 2000a) criticise the Malaysian government for instituting liberal economic 
policies, as can be seen in a series of deregulation and privatisation policies since 
the 1980s, such critiques overlook the contradicting approaches of the Malaysian 
government itself. It is true that the Malaysian government has been reducing its 
role in welfare, providing healthcare through a series of deregulation and 
privatisation policies, but this cannot be equated to liberalisation if liberalisation 
means minimal intervention by the state in the market. It should be noted that 
although the past three decades saw a range of deregulation and privatisation 
policies emerge, increasing investment and intervention by the Malaysian 
government in profitable markets and rhetoric against liberalisation pressure 
imposed by supranational groups were also observed during the same period of 
time. The state's role has changed from being solely a regulator of markets to a 
mixture of regulator and investor in the past few decades. The right-left 
distinction is thus not a powerful analytical tool to understand the ideology of the 
Malaysian government.  
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Figure 2: Triangular relationship and interaction between state, market and civil society 
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Last but not least is the extent to which the activities of pressure groups are 
tolerated or suppressed by the state. Democratised regimes tend to be more 
tolerant of, responsive to and consultative divergent demands in a pluralised 
society. Active group politics is thus a common political scene in liberal 
democracies. In the case of Malaysia, Crouch (1996: 236–247) calls Malaysian 
government as a 'repressive-responsive regime', democratic in terms of 
constitutional structure but tending to use an authoritarian approach to control 
social divisions and political tensions. Factionalism and social differentiation, 
created by industrial development, provide incentives for the leadership to protect 
interests and maintain stability by resorting to repressive measures, but at the 
same time, diversification also "act[s] as a brake on authoritarianism" (Crouch, 
1994: 32). As an authoritarian capitalist state, which plays both regulator and 
investor roles in the profitable market, the Malaysian government does not seek 
consultation by nature, but its power is likely to be limited as it is faced with 
countervailing forces in an increasingly divided and pluralised industrial society.  
 
 
DIVERGENCE AND DIFFERENTIATION WITHIN THE 
HEALTHCARE SECTOR IN MALAYSIA 
 
Social Divergence in the Pre-independence Period 
 
During the colonisation of Malaya by the British, traditional healers played an 
important role in delivering healthcare and ritual services to the natives and 
immigrant labourers, while western healthcare services were originally meant 
primarily for the purpose of serving the needs of British administrators, troops 
and other colonists in Colonial Malaya (Manderson, 1996: 15). When western 
biomedical services were newly introduced by the British Colonial government to 
the natives and immigrant labourers in Malaya around a century ago, in order to 
control the health status and thus the productivity of the colonised community, it 
was then but one option among many competing traditional practices (Manderson, 
1996: 18–25). A shortage of human and physical resources was another obstacle 
to the British population-based approach of maintaining a healthy and strong 
labour supply for the expansion of colonial state capitalism. Traditional healers, 
especially midwives, were thus later co-opted into the colonial healthcare system 
to legitimise the state's control over the domestic affairs and maternal health of 
the natives and immigrant communities (Manderson, 1996: 201–229). Schools 
were established to educate the girls and women of the colonised communities on 
domestic science and hygiene, and local women were recruited to be trained as 
western, biomedical midwives beginning in the early 20th century. Compulsory 
registration, for both biomedically and locally trained midwives, was also 
instituted in 1917 to control the practice of midwifery. The allocation of roles 
within the biomedical healthcare system and hospitals, however, was based on 
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race, not on training. Europeans were always regarded by the Colonial 
government as superior (Manderson, 1996: 212) and were given superior 
positions (Manderson, 1996: 208). The differential treatment of locally recruited 
and foreign-recruited personnel was not only reflected by positions held, but also 
by salaries, opportunities for promotion and status (Cohen, 1971: 124; Danaraj, 
1988: 23). 
 
By distinguishing between white European and non-white-European labour14 and 
associating the demarcation with biomedicine vs. traditional healing, modern vs. 
backward and superior vs. inferior, the British Colonial government instituted 
new social stratification in the colonial society. The new social stratification was 
then the main divergence in the society, where people were accorded treatment 
and granted authority based on racial differences. Such demarcation continued 
among the locals even after independence, as can be seen in the negative attitudes 
of western-trained, local physicians to traditional healers. Sometimes, such 
differences have become a source of tension between western-trained, local 
healthcare providers and traditional healers (Laderman, 1983: 103–123) and have 
persisted even after decades of independence (see the following section and  
Table 1).  
 
Though bred within a historical context of the cultural and social collision 
between local, traditional authority and western colonial power, the development 
of the biomedical professions in Malaysia shared many similarities with their 
western counterparts in terms of professionalisation: it took them quite some 
decades to gain acceptance for biomedical science in the larger society before it 
was able to consolidate and become dominant among all healers; its 
consolidation and professionalisation were backed by the state through a 
registration and licensure system; and, its professional interest was protected, and 
its dominance maintained, through the active political engagement of 
occupational associations. The establishment of the Straits Medical Association 
and the Journal of Straits Medical Association (JSMA) in 1890 by a group of 
medical officers, all British, was one such effort to advance the development of 
the profession and cater to the need for in-service education by the medical 
community (Cohen, 1971). The association, however, faced difficulty in 
recruiting new members until it was registered as the Malaya Branch of the 
British Medical Association (MBBMA) in 1894 (Cohen, 1971), and the JSMA 
was also renamed correspondingly as the Journal of Malaya Branch of British 
Medical Association (JMBBMA) in 1904 (Chen, 1982). The change in name of 
the association and its journal is illustrative of the aforementioned social 
stratification and contention. Nevertheless, disgruntlement started to grow in the 
local professional community after World War II, as it was exposed to the full 
experience of running hospitals without governance by British officers during 
war time and thus gained confidence. The Alumni Association of the King 
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Edward VII College of Medicine, the oldest organisation of local medical 
professionals, was seen taking political character in 1948 to represent the views 
and interests of the local men to the British administrator (Cohen, 1971). Turning 
political a few years before independence, the Alumni Association was mainly 
concerned with breaking the discriminatory dichotomy between the British and 
the local and gaining independence from colonial authority. Two years after 
independence, the Malayan Medical Association (MMA) was formed out of 
merging the MBBMA and the Alumni Association, reflecting the political 
developments that were taking place during the post-war era.  
 
As a body that sought to cultivate professionalism and uphold the interests of its 
members, the MBBMA basically was "advising government in medical matters" 
(Strahan, 1948) and providing in-service education, through seminars and 
publication, since the British colonial era (Cohen, 1971). It was undeniable that 
the MBBMA, and later its successor, the MMA, had enjoyed status as the sole 
official representative for the medical profession in Malaysia from the post-war 
years until 1980. Other than the physician's group, the post-war years also saw 
the formation of the Trained Nurses League Penang in 1950, the Malayan 
Trained Nurses Association (MTNA) in 1952 and many other paramedical 
groups. However, the relationship between different occupational groups within 
the healthcare industry in the pre-independence and early post-independence 
years has yet to be explored. The social divergence that made the physician's 
group turn political in the pre-independence years was to break the discriminatory 
binary barrier, not differentiation among physicians nor between physicians and 
other healthcare providers.  
 
Social Change and Differentiation in the Post-independence Years  
 
The early period of post-independence saw the continued persistence of local 
elites to decolonise local society. One such effort was to establish a local higher 
education system in order to produce enough skilful workers for social 
development. Local medical education was seen as needed and urgent in order to 
gain autonomy and cease reliance on foreign doctors to provide for the healthcare 
needs of the local community (Danaraj, 1988: 22). The ability to train local 
medical professionals in local universities was an integral part of the newly 
independent nation's self-strengthening, industrialisation and modernisation.  
 
On the way to becoming a modern, industrialised and developed nation, the 
Malaysian government introduced a new dichotomy to replace the discriminatory 
binary between the British and locals after the race riot on 13 May 1969, which 
was claimed to be the result of economic inequity between the Chinese and 
Malays.18 Bumiputra and non-Bumiputra became new markers under the New 
Economic Policy (NEP), introduced in 1971 by then Prime Minister Tun Abdul 
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Razak in order to narrow the disparity between the two communities. The stated 
objectives and goals of the NEP, which sought to restructure the economy so as 
to eliminate the identification of ethnicity with economic function, were good, 
but the implementation had been controversial. Two decades after the 
implementation of the NEP, the expansion of the middle class or the emergence 
of the new middle class across ethnic groups generally and in the Malay 
community particularly is seen as a direct result of the state's intervention in 
restructuring the economy (Abdul Rahman, 2001).  
 
It is in this historical context, that non-race-based social differentiation caught the 
attention of some social scientists, who focused on the study of the middle class 
as a potential base for democratisation. They were particularly concerned with 
how much or to what extent the political and civic engagement of the newly 
emergent middle class could break the communal politics that had dominated the 
country since independence (Kahn, 1996; Saravamuttu, 2001; Abdul Rahman, 
2001, 2002). Supportive to or sceptical about the state, embracing or opposing 
racial politics, these dichotomies actually do not exhaust the divergence of the 
new middle class. Other than diversification along racial, religious and political 
lines, new differentiations that involve competition for authority and resources 
within certain industrial sectors, such as the healthcare sector, also take place as a 
result of industrialisation and development. The new division of labour, the 
introduction of administrators, such as MCOs or TPAs, and the emergence of 
different healthcare providers, such as physiotherapists, pharmacists etc., within 
the healthcare industry, are also result of the state's development policies in the 
late 1980s. Old racial politics continue to persist, while new group politics have 
begun to emerge. The following discussion will focus on the differentiation as 
manifested in the formation of different groups within the Malaysian healthcare 
industry. These groups not only reflect the plurality within the modern healthcare 
sector, which is interposed between the individual and the state, but they also 
function to articulate, aggregate and organise divergent interests in modern 
industrial society. 
 
Before independence, although it was engaged in the larger anti-colonisation 
political movement, the MMA mainly adopted a non-political stance in favour of 
upholding professional interest, such as holding seminars and publishing new 
scientific information. Nevertheless, the MMA became increasingly political 
after independence. Conflict between physicians and the newly independent state 
became common in the days after independence. Resources were scarce then, yet 
demands were growing among the population and physicians as well. Salary 
scale, opportunity for promotion, work load and the outflow of medical officers 
from government service to private practice were among the most debated issues. 
The MMA was vocal about the working conditions of medical officers in public 
hospitals and keen on protecting the image of physicians who left public service 
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for private practice. It was also active in contributing ideas for developing and 
upgrading the nation's healthcare system, such as medical education, the training 
of specialists and recruitment of foreign doctors to overcome shortages in public 
hospitals.  
 
The political character of the MMA has grown even stronger, and the state-group 
relation has become more complicated, since the 1990s. The main reason for this 
change is the healthcare privatisation policy, a strategy of industrial development 
undertaken by the Malaysian government in the late 1980s. The MMA's activities 
are increasingly political in the sense that the physician community as an 
organised bloc is increasingly bargaining collectively with the state whenever 
there are indications of likely impingement on the economic setting or 
professional autonomy of physicians' work in the process of federal policy 
formulation or promulgation. This can be observed in its response, sometimes 
even protest, to many of the policy recommendations or implementations made 
by the federal government, such as the proposal of the National Health Financing 
Scheme, the mandatory medical screening of foreign labour by the authorised 
company FOMEMA, compulsory engagement with authorised clinical waste 
disposal companies, e-Kesihatan, the separation of prescribing and dispensing etc. 
Table 1 shows a series of contentions that have been taking place within the 
Malaysian healthcare industry since 1996. 
 
Parallel with its growing political character, however, the MMA has gradually 
been losing its status as the sole voice of the medical community in the face of 
rapid differentiation and expanding plurality within the healthcare industry. The 
establishment of the Primary Care Doctors' Organisation Malaysia (PCDOM) in 
the mid-1990s is a sign of increasing divergence between primary care doctors 
and corporate hospital practitioners. The frequent appearance of the Federation of 
Private Medical Practitioners' Association of Malaysia (FPMPAM), which was 
founded in 1989, in the mainstream media in the past few years is another 
symptom of the growing disparity between physicians working in public 
hospitals and those in private settings. Both the MMA and FPMPAM are very 
aggressive in their publicity campaigns. Media exposure is not only a channel to 
voice their grievances on certain policies but also a way to uphold the 
community's image. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
'Frankenstein' within the Healthcare Industry 
253 
Table 1: Inter-group and state-group contentions within the Malaysian healthcare industry 
since 1996 
 
Year Inter-group or state-group 
contention  
Description 
1996 National Healthcare Financing 
Scheme proposal 
The recommendation was first made during 
early 1980's. MMA expressed serious 
concern when the federal proposal 
reemerged during late 1990s. Such concern 
is documented in MMA (1999). 
1997 Mandatory health screening for 
all legal foreign workers in 
Malaysia by authorised private 
agent, FOMEMA 
FOMEMA stands for Foreign Workers' 
Medical Examination Monitoring Agency. 
It is also a government linked company, 
established in 1997 to manage and operate a 
mandatory foreign worker health screening 
system in Peninsular Malaysia. The federal 
government's decision was not so welcomed 
by MMA, the then President Dr. Milton 
Lum claimed that the doctors, like the 
foreign workers and the employers, were 
the victim of the new agreement. See New 
Straits Times, 22 September, 1997, National 
News, pg. 17. 
1998 Promulgation of Private 
Healthcare Facilities and 
Services Act 1998 
The act was not enforced until the 
promulgation of Private Healthcare 
Facilities and Services Regulation 2006 
eight years later by the then Health 
Minister, Dr. Chua Soi Lek. 
July 2002 Compulsory engagement with 
authorised clinical waste 
disposal companies 
Introduced in the mid of 2002, the policy 
requires all clinics to engage with only three 
registered companies appointed by the 
Department of Environment for clinical 
waste disposal service, effective on 1 July 
2002. MMA released a press statement 
"MMA Advises Private Clinics to Engage 
the Services of Authorised Clinical Waste 
Disposal Companies Only", on 23 August 
2002. The private practitioners were 
particularly not happy with the fee and other 
terms of service. 
May 2004 Private wing in government 
hospital  
APHM expressed discontentment over the 
government's decision to set up private 
wing within government hospital, which 
was aimed to stop brain drain. It was 
perceived by the former as threat to the 
private hospital's business. APHM insisted 
that government should leave the market of 
the rich patient to private hospital. See 
APHM's position paper, "Private Wings in 
Public Sector Hospitals", on 10 May 2004. 
 
(continued) 
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Table 1: (continued) 
 
Year Inter-group or state-group 
contention  
Description 
July 2005 Replacing Hospital Directors 
with Paramedics or 
Administrative Officers 
No policies announced this time, it was just 
a precaution taken by the MMA to warn 
against the government from any move of 
appointing paramedics, other administrators 
or non-physicians as director of the 
government hospital. The event illustrates 
the tension between physicians and 
paramedics as well as administrators. 
March 2006 Dispute over the Term of 
Reference of NHFS 
On early 2006, EPU disclosed terms of 
reference on the National Health Financing 
Scheme (NHFS), which MOH was unable 
to provide when pressed upon by a                
civil coalition called Coalition Against 
Healthcare Privatization (CAHP). The event 
uncovered MOH's relatively minor position, 
in relation to EPU, over healthcare policy 
decision.  
April 2006 Promulgation of Private 
Healthcare Facilities and 
Services Regulation 2006 
Private practitioners and clinics are 
particularly unhappy with the requirement 
under this regulation that they had to re-
register with MOH and the hefty fines and 
jail term if they fail to re-register. This is 
mainly tension between the private 
practitioners and the MOH. See the MMA's 
press statement on 21 April 2006 and 27 
June 2006. 
April 2006 Introduction of traditional 
medicine into public hospital 
systems by MOH 
Traditional Medicine section was 
introduced in selected government hospital. 
MMA opposed the idea and clamed that 
traditional medicine is "premature", "non-
evidence based", "unproven medical 
systems" run by "improperly trained and 
unlicensed persons". This episode is the 
continued tension between traditional 
healers and biomedical professionals since 
British colonial years. See their press 
statement, "Traditional medicine to be 
introduced selected government hospitals: 
MMA's views" on 27 April 2006. 
 
(continued) 
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Table 1: (continued) 
 
Year Inter-group or state-group 
contention  
Description 
2007–2008 e-Kesihatan E-Kesihatan is a federal policy proposed by 
the Road Transport Department. Under this 
proposal, the compulsory annual medical 
examination of commercial transport 
drivers is to be monitored by a third party, a 
private company between the drivers and 
the doctors, and only clinics registered with 
the company are allowed to carry out the 
screening. The intention was firstly 
expressed on early 2006 and re-raised in 
late 2007, but scraped in late 2008 in face      
of strong protest by both the physician 
community and the commercial drivers. 
MMA released at least seven press 
statements from 2006 to 2008 on                        
e-Kesihatan. 
2007–2008 MCO charging doctor 
"management fee" or "splitting 
fee" case 
This episode involves conflict between 
Federation of Private Medical Practitioners 
Association (FPMPAM) and Managed Care 
Organization, ING. During September 
2007, ING demanded discounts from the 
doctors and private hospitals in order for the 
latter to be on the insurance company's 
panel. The discount, claimed ING senior 
vice-president Mr. Phoon Yew Sang, would 
not affect the patients, and would be passed 
back to their customers and not go to ING. 
The proposal was considered as "fee-
splitting"a, an unethical practice, by private 
practitioners. Physicians from eight private 
hospitals in Klang Valley formed Joint Inter 
Hospital Committee (JIHC) to oppose the 
plan. Both camps claimed that their concern 
was patient centered and were aggressive in 
their advocacy. The controversy ended on 
April 2008, with the MCO required to 
register with MOH and only discount in 
administration fee is allowed. 
 
(continued) 
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Table 1: (continued) 
 
Year Inter-group or state-group 
contention  
Description 
2008 Reviewing private hospital 
charges 
This is a continuation of the above tension 
between MCO and private hospital that 
started on the third quarter of 2007. The 
focus is on hospital charges in this dispute. 
It shows that there is a certain degree of 
tension between hospital and physicians, as 
the latter do not own hospital and some are 
not satisfied that hospital charges are not 
regulated while medical fees are. Both 
MMA and FOMCA supported the Health 
Ministry's plan to review private hospital 
charges for room, equipment and medicine. 
See "Ministry to study hospital charges" in 
The Star, 17 April, 2008 and Milton Lumb 
(May 2008) "Hospital charges and fee 
splitting". The Star, 18 May 2008. 
January 
2009 
Separation of prescribing and 
dispensing  
The contention took place around early 
2008, between pharmacist group and 
physicians. MMA protested against the 
proposal in its press statement, "MMA 
opposes the separation of the role of 
prescribing and dispensing by doctors", on 
29 March 2008. 
October 
2009  
One Malaysia Clinic and 
paramedical 
Both MMA and FPMPAM opposed the 
setting up of One Malaysia Clinic which is 
to be run by paramedics. It is perceived as a 
threat to the physician's authority generally 
and to solo practitioners particularly. The 
urban solo practitioners especially take it as 
a blow on their business. 
October 
2009 
Primary care feeder clinics by 
private corporate hospital 
This episode is illustrative of the tensions 
between solo practitioner and corporate 
hospital. See MMA press statement, 
"Private Medical Centers break the law by 
opening feeder primary care clinics", on 21 
October 2009. 
 
a -  A type of kick-back arrangement 
b -  It should be noted that Milton Lum is former President of MAA, for year 1997. He is very active, even 
after relieved from the MAA's Presidentship, in protecting professional interest through writing articles 
for the media and vocal in many episode of contentions in the past few years. 
 
The emergence of managerialism and the growth of bureaucratisation can be 
observed in the formation of the Association of Private Hospitals Malaysia 
(APHM), which represents the commercial interests of the owners and 
administrators of corporate hospitals. Though private hospitals are not new in the 
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Malaysian healthcare industry, until recently they were basically run by doctors 
and charitable organisations, and the total number was small. By the 1990s, 
profit-oriented private hospitals began to be set up by large corporate entities, 
leading to a new phase in the development of private hospitals. This occurred as a 
result of the state's healthcare liberalisation, deregulation and privatisation project, 
which marked the beginning of healthcare pluralisation (Barraclough, 1997). The 
liberalisation of healthcare was not only a response to the external structural 
adjustment requirements or deregulation pressures that were imposed by 
supranational organisations such as International Monetary Fund and World 
Bank in the 1980s as a condition for the developing country to get development 
loans (Chan, 2000a, 2000b; Subramaniam, 2000); it has also been a measure 
undertaken by the Malaysian government to relieve the public healthcare system 
from becoming overburdened (Barraclough, 1999). Another internal factor 
conducive to the expansion of private healthcare came from the growing middle 
class and newly emerging urban areas (Barraclough, 1997), which were a result 
of state-led industrialisation. Both increasing buying power and growing 
discontent over public healthcare services among the middle class provide 
incentives for the expansion of the profitable private healthcare market. As of 
2006, the total number of private hospital had reached 233, up from 50 in 1980. 
Table 2 shows different combinations of ownership and financing of Malaysian 
healthcare services. The mushrooming of private corporate hospitals led to the 
emergence of hospital administrators and growing tensions between managers 
and the physicians within the private hospital setting. Business competition 
between sub-sectors C and D is also a source of conflict, as can be seen in the 
APHM's opposition to the establishment of a private wing within a public 
hospital in the middle of 2004 and the MMA's opposition to One Malaysia 
Clinics in late 2009 (refer Table 1). Other than contention across sub-sectors, 
there is also divergence within the same sub-sector. The MMA's disgruntlement 
over primary-care feeder clinics run by corporate hospitals takes place within 
sub-sector D; this is symptomatic of the tension between solo practitioners and 
corporate hospitals. 
  
Other than the division of labour among physicians and conflict between 
administrators and physicians, the emergence of paramedical professionals has 
further added to the tension between different groups in the medical industry. The 
entry of Managed Care Organisations (MCO) into the medical industry after 
1994 is another source of complexity in healthcare politics, as observed in 
frequent friction and collective bargaining between private corporate practitioners 
and the MCOs over terms of purchase and payment for healthcare service. There 
are a few episodes particularly symptomatic of this divergence. One took place in 
2005, when the MMA opposed the suggestion of replacing Hospital Directors 
with Paramedics or Administrative Officers (refer Table 1). Another occurred in 
the first quarter of 2008, when the MMA stood by the FOMCA to welcome the 
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proposed move by the MOH to review private hospital charges for room 
equipment and medicine, while the APHM was not so happy with it (refer        
Table 1). Conflict between pharmacists and physicians also emerged around the 
first quarter of 2009, when the former attempted to promote the separation of 
prescribing and dispensing (refer Table 1). One additional episode of inter-group 
conflict, which has great impact on the public, is worth noting. It took place 
between physicians and MCOs over the terms of purchase and payment. 
Portraying themselves as 'patient/consumer advocate[s]', both professional groups 
and MCOs tend to use rhetoric such as 'for the patient's benefit' or 'for consumers' 
rights' in defence of their proposals or counter proposals whenever disputes 
emerge. Although affected, consumers are often regarded as objects of 
exploitation by different groups, and yet they are not organised as a collective-
bargaining bloc like professional groups and MCOs. The MOH, squeezed 
between contending groups and expected to be an impartial arbitrator acting for 
the benefit of the public, is always perceived as benefiting certain sectoral 
interests by resolving disputes.  
 
Table 2: Malaysian health system: Ownership of providers and financing of health 
services 
 
 Ownership of providers 
Public Private 
 
 
 
 
Financing of health 
services 
Publicly funded: 
entitlements 
(citizens, 
government 
employees), 
donations and 
(co)payments 
A. Formal public sector: 
rationed, free or 
highly-subsidised 
services 
B. Non-profit providers:  
voluntary services,  
donations, paying 
patients, internal cross 
subsidies 
Privately funded: 
self-paid 
private employers, 
co-payments 
C. Publicly-owned 
commercial providers, 
private wards/patients 
D. Privately-owned 
commercial providers 
 
Source: Chan (2010)  
 
Group formation and activities, inter-group conflicts and the state-group friction 
are all illustrative of the new differentiation that has been taking place since the 
implementation of privatisation in the late 1980s. As can be seen in the active 
political engagement of different groups in the past two decades, the aggregation 
of interest and collective bargaining put forward by these professional 
associations and guilds are highly tolerated by the Malaysian government, 
compared with what other democratisation or social movement groups, such as 
BERSIH, HINDRAF and Gabungan Mansuhkan ISA (GMI), have experienced. 
No professional associations or guilds have ever resorted to public assembly as a 
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way to express their interests, probably because they are resourceful and have 
many channels through which to exert their influence. The Medical Council is 
one of such channel in which physicians' views are consulted. Their collective 
bargaining activities are tolerated as long as they pose little or no threat to the 
ruling coalition's political interests.  
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Although there was competition between traditional healers and biomedical 
professionals in the pre-independence period, the discriminatory dichotomy 
created by the British colonial government was the main social divergence. The 
Alumni Association of the King Edward VII College of Medicine adopted a 
political character in the early years after World War II to break the binary 
system imposed by the British. In the early post-independence period, although 
there were different intensities of tension between the MMA and the state on 
many occasions, an economic imbalance between bumiputra and non-bumiputra 
was the main social contention. Four decades after gaining independence, new 
social differentiations arose and became new sources of conflict in the newly 
industrialised Malaysia. Among the new divergences within the healthcare 
industry were those among physicians, the division of labour among different 
occupations and competition between sub-sectors. The formation of new 
professional groups and guilds and inter-group/inter-occupational conflicts are 
illustrative of the new differentiation and stratification.  
 
Control of medical work and control of economic arrangements are two loci of 
competition for power. Analytically, these are two different concepts. In practice, 
they are always overlapped, as control of work usually, although not always, 
guarantees control of remuneration. Rivalry between physicians and paramedics 
is a competition over control of medical work or professional autonomy, whereas 
the contest among doctors and the contention between the former and 
administrators, MCOs, commercial players (e.g., the APHM) and the state are 
usually over control of remuneration or economic arrangements. In terms of 
capability and politicisation, physicians' groups are clearly more powerful than 
paramedical groups and MCOs, as can be observed in their aggressive PR 
campaigning, lobbying activities, frequent publicity and regular publication. 
Among physicians, primary care doctors' positions are more vulnerable than the 
positions of their specialist and corporate-bond counterparts. It is obvious that 
consumer groups are rarely present in these contests, reflecting an imbalance in 
interest representation during each contention. Finally, the state is not a neutral 
player; it is also an investor in the profitable, private healthcare market.  
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Given this plurality, any change in healthcare policy in the near future is likely to 
add more diversities, contentions and uncertainties to the healthcare system. 
Although there are many different lines of diversification in modern, 
industrialised Malaysia, this study shares the concern of some other social 
scientists regarding the role of the new middle class as the prime force of 
democratisation. After five decades of independence, social change has made 
democratisation an urgent matter in order to institutionalise a fair and transparent 
mediation framework of new social diversifications in contemporary Malaysia. 
Though different healthcare professions and commercial players are mainly 
concerned with their own sectoral interests, competition could be a process that 
allows each player to learn and recognise the plurality of modern industrial 
society and the importance of having a fair and transparent mechanism that 
represents different interests. Group politics research is thus very important and 
worth further exploration, as it captures the intermediate level between the 
middle class and the state, how different interests are aggregated and how 
mediation takes place in modern industrial Malaysia. 
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NOTES 
 
1. The term 'Frankenstein' in the title of this article is a metaphor. 'Frankenstein's 
monster' (or referred to as 'Frankenstein' here) is created by a scientist to control life 
and death, but later the creature gains life and a will of its own. Pluralisation created 
out of industrial development is very much like the man-made 'Frankenstein'. This 
article aims to capture how the 'Frankenstein' of the healthcare industry has been 
created and its impact on the healthcare sector within which it has been created. 
2. See Nik Rosnah Wan Abdullah (2005: 54) and Health Facts (2006) by Ministry of 
Health (MOH). Both figures include private maternity and nursing homes, as the 
MOH does not sort them out from private hospitals.  
3. The figures shown here include both public and private medical schools. There were 
no private medical schools before the 1990s. See speech delivered by Ismail Merican 
(2009) as Director General of Ministry of Health. See also Kuljit Singh (February 
2010) and Danaraj (1988). 
4. In 2008, the ratio was 1:1105. For details, see Ismail Merican (2009). 
5. Berita MMA is a monthly bulletin published by the Malaysia Medical Association 
(MMA). 
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6. The consolidation of bio-medicine as a dominant healthcare profession in the 
West only took place around the early 20th century. Today, physicians are no 
longer considered new middle class in the West. They have been, rather, 
regarded as the old professions in the American and European contexts since the 
middle of the 20th century, which saw the rise of managers and administrators as 
the new professions. For a related discussion, see Mills (1967). In Malaysia, 
both managerial and professional occupations are commonly termed new middle 
class by different social scientists who define the term based on occupations. 
However, with the rise of managerialism, tensions grow between administrators 
and physicians within healthcare organisations. This point will be discussed 
further in the following section. 
7. Such a view is common among the national leaders and ministerial officers, who 
tend to take professional contribution to national development for granted.  
8. According to their observations, the Association of Private Hospital Malaysia 
(APHM), MMA and FOMCA are relatively more frequently consulted than the 
more critical Consumer Association of Penang (CAP). 
9. The distinction Dahrendorf made between capitalistic and industrial societies is 
based on the separation of ownership and administration, but that discussion is 
beyond the scope of this study.  
10. For detailed discussion of internal factors that affect the collective action of 
occupational-turned-political groups, refer Olson (1965), Eckstein (1960) and, 
Ball and Millard (1986). 
11. This episode of tussle is documented in The Star (14 December 2005), Netto 
(2006) and Subramaniam (2005). 
12. As can be seen in the tariff protection of the two national car manufacturers 
against foreign competitor. 
13. Investment in private profitable chain hospital by Khazanah Nasional Berhad 
and Kumpulan Perubatan Johor (KPJ), both state owned enterprise, to generate 
revenue are examples of the state's role as investor in profitable healthcare 
market. 
14. Including the natives and immigrant labour from China and India. 
15. It was originally named as Straits Settlements and Federated Malay States 
Government Medical School in 1905 and renamed as King Edward VII Medical 
School in 1912. Since the term school was perceived as not conveying the 
academic status of university standard, it was later renamed as King Edward VII 
College of Medicine in 1920 and reinstituted as the Faculty of Medicine under 
Malaya University in 1948. See Cohen (1971). 
16. Later renamed Malaysian Medical Association, but the year when it was 
renamed as such is unclear. Singapore Medical Association was formed in the 
same year, separated from the then Malayan Medical Association. See Chia 
(2006). 
17. Renamed as Malaysian Nurses Association in 1980, see Malaysian Nurses 
Association (n.d.). 
18. Not all social researchers agree that it was a racial riot, see Kua (2007).  
19. The discussion on MMA-state conflict during early post-independent years is 
based on the news article in the Straits Times from year 1957 to 1972 and Berita 
MMA from 1970s throughout 1980s. 
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20. Such as primary care and tertiary care or specialists, corporate and government 
bond practitioners. 
21. Such as nurse, radiologist, lab technician, anaesthesia technician, physiotherapist, 
pharmacist, etc. 
22. See news article 'Managing healthcare,' The Star, 20 April 2008.  
23. The Star, "Health Ministry to check on private hospital charges deemed 
excessive," 16 April 2008. 
24. Read commentary made by former MMA President, Milton Lum, "Hospital 
charges and fee splitting," The Star, 18 May 2008. 
25. Coalition of Abolishing ISA.  
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